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José Medina situates his recent book as an exercise in non-
ideal theory (13) that furthers the project of articulating 
an account of the integral role that epistemology plays 
in relation to political theory and praxis. In other words, 
following in the footsteps of Lorraine Code, Miranda Fricker, 
Linda Alcoﬀ, and so many other laborers in the vineyard 
of what might be thought of as liberatory epistemology, 
Medina’s text undertakes the twofold project of articulating 
the particularly (though not purely) epistemic manifestations 
of oppression (especially in terms of gender, race, and 
sexuality) on the one hand, and the epistemic practices 
and conditions necessary for liberation from oppression on 
the other. Medina oﬀers a diagnosis and a prescription in 
relation to the ways and means whereby oppression harms 
us in our particular capacities as knowers, and the ways and 
means whereby our knowledge practices and standards 
reinforce, legitimate, or mitigate oppression. The task he 
thus sets for himself is indubitably ambitious, and he draws 
upon a diverse array thinkers, traditions, and examples to 
achieve his aims. The end result is an impressive example 
of the integral link between intellectual work and activism, 
pairing rigorous scholarship and theoretical acumen with 
a clear sensitivity to the ways in which those intellectual 
virtues will or will not “pay oﬀ” in terms of concrete action. 
The range and depth of The Epistemology of Resistance 
is such that I cannot hope to oﬀer a chapter-by-chapter 
summary in the scope of this review, so I will proceed by 
oﬀering a very brief sketch of the overall argument before 
oﬀering a more in-depth account of what I take to be one 
crucial aspect of the text. 
Medina makes clear from the outset that his focus is upon 
the “epistemic aspects of our social interactions” that “take 
place in complex and diverse communities under conditions 
of oppression” (3). As he argues in the course of the text, 
oppression functions in part by fostering in the oppressors 
a kind of ignorance, insensitivity, and indiﬀerence to the 
suﬀering of others that he calls epistemic arrogance (31), 
while among the oppressed it fosters ego skepticism, 
which is “a skepticism about the self, about its capacities 
and even about its very existence” (42). Oppression thus 
fosters both a ﬁrst-order ignorance about the workings 
of the social world and one’s role within that world, and a 
meta-ignorance that obscures one’s sense of one’s own 
epistemic failings (149). In other words, under just epistemic 
conditions, one will typically acknowledge one’s own 
epistemic lacunae—one will have some knowledge of one’s 
ignorance, but oppression facilitates an ignorance of one’s 
own ignorance through a variety of mechanisms Medina 
describes in compelling detail. Signiﬁcantly, this ignorance 
must be understood as an active ignorance (56) for which 
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we bear responsibility as individuals and as members of 
communities (226). This active ignorance, functioning on 
both the ﬁrst-order and the meta-level, aims at establishing 
a dominant mode of understanding the world that drowns 
out, disavows, or ignores alternative understandings. Part of 
the epistemic harm is thus that the false universal of (for 
example) the masculine or white perspective, in establishing 
itself as the normative hegemonic view, creates epistemic 
conditions in which it is very diﬃcult for alternative, resistant 
perspectives to assert themselves. At the heart of Medina’s 
critical endeavor is thus a critique of any epistemological 
theory that makes the arrival at some stable endpoint, or 
even a ﬁxed and settled consensus, its telos. Rather, what 
should motivate our epistemic endeavors is the fostering 
of what he refers to as a “kaleidoscopic consciousness” 
(200) in which knowledge is always in friction with resistant 
perspectives between communities, between individuals 
within a community, and internally to a given agent. Only 
through this ongoing process of friction are we able to 
approach “meta-lucidity” (192). 
The “resistance” of the book’s title, therefore, refers 
both to the praxis of resisting oppression, and to the 
positive kinds of epistemic resistance that Medina argues 
are necessary components of that praxis. Adequately 
resisting oppression, in other words, requires that we take 
responsibility for our epistemic shortcomings. Through 
particularly compelling use of examples, Medina lays out 
his account of the responsibility we bear as epistemic 
agents on a variety of levels and vectors. As individuals, 
we bear responsibility both for our ﬁrst-order ignorance 
of the diﬀerent situations and perspectives of relevant 
others and their histories (and very often in the case of the 
privileged, of one’s own particular diﬀerence, perspective, 
and history), as well as for the meta-ignorance we bear in 
relation to that ﬁrst-order ignorance (the ways in which 
we ignore or disavow our own ignorance). Both of these 
manifestations of ignorance, however, are fostered and 
supported within and through communities, and thus there 
must always be a social aspect to that responsibility (158). 
To advance his articulation of this social aspect, Medina’s 
text oﬀers a thorough and sophisticated account of what he 
refers to as “the insuﬃciencies of purely individualistic and 
purely collectivist views of responsibility with respect to 
justice” (313). While he does not deny that individuals can 
and do act as individuals, and collectivities act collectively, 
he argues that the most eﬃcacious political resistance 
will require “chained action,” where actions are repeated 
by others, and “coalesce in such a way that they become 
a traceable performative chain, with each action in the 
chain having traceable eﬀects in the subsequent actions 
of others” (225). This makes it possible, he argues, for us 
to conceive of our responsibilities as chained to that of 
diverse others (individual and collective). Ultimately, an 
epistemology of resistance aims not at the assimilation 
or even integration of all diﬀerence, but rather seeks a 
“network solidarity” (308) that acknowledges diﬀerence, 
and fosters a pluralism that can generate and sustain 
the beneﬁcial epistemic friction that Medina holds to be 
a necessary condition both for eﬀective resistance of 
oppression and for the cultivation of the epistemic virtues 
conducive to meta-lucidity under conditions of what he 
refers to as “polyphonic contextualism” (206). 
Having oﬀered this very brief sketch of the overall 
argument of Medina’s text, I will now turn to a more 
focused engagement with a speciﬁc theme, namely, the 
theme of metaphor in relation to our accounts of epistemic 
justice. While Medina employs such metaphors throughout 
the text, he only addresses the topic explicitly, and brieﬂy, 
in the forward. In the remainder of this review, I will argue 
that Medina’s actual use of metaphor oﬀers advantages 
that remain only implicit in the text, and that rendering 
them explicit can, in fact, strengthen his overall argument. 
It is diﬃcult to take on issues of epistemology and 
oppression without drawing upon a long and well-
established line of metaphors for knowledge that appeal 
to vision. The hegemony of this metaphor, as well as the 
more common and compelling critiques of it, are doubtless 
well known to anyone who has worked on these issues.1 
Aside from the inherent privileging of perceptual ability 
to be found in contrasting with disability, the visual 
paradigm has been critiqued for entailing a rigid subject/ 
object distinction, and generating an understanding of 
perception as a passive phenomenon. In the forward to The 
Epistemology of Resistance, Medina states that he hopes 
“to have contributed a bit to such overcoming [of the visual 
paradigm] by avoiding the visual language at least in some 
of my discussions when it was possible and appropriate,” 
turning instead to more neutral terms like insensitivity and 
numbness (xii). In describing this decision, he appeals 
to the “problems associated with equating epistemic 
deﬁciencies with perception disabilities,” but makes little 
reference to the more theoretical critiques of the visual 
metaphor (ibid.). 
This is a weakness, I submit, insofar as the metaphors that 
Medina actually uses in the course of his text manifest 
advantages over the visual paradigm in terms of theory that 
both illustrate his larger understanding and demonstrate 
the weaknesses of the visual paradigm. For example, his 
use of the friction metaphor appeals to touch. Polyphonic 
contextualism and the need for our actions to “echo” 
within a context of chained action appeal to sound (244). 
These appeals to touch and sound avoid the theoretical 
limitations of the visual paradigm in ways that Medina 
himself does not make explicit. To touch is at the same 
time to be touched, thus avoiding the radical subject/ 
object distinction common to the visual paradigm, and 
placing the touching/touched in both a passive and active 
role in relation to one another. Likewise, sound is a matter 
of the interaction of components through a medium that 
connects the listener with the source of the sound. Indeed, 
sound is in fact generated by a kind of resistance between 
objects, either when one object strikes another, as with a 
drum, or when two objects are brought together in a way 
that generates friction, as with a bow and violin string. This 
means that friction/touch always generates sound (even if 
it is not always audible by humans), which in turn is always 
felt as much as heard, demonstrating the interconnectivity 
of these two modes of sensation. 
Medina’s use of these metaphors of touch and sound 
thus help, because of the ways in which they function as 
sensations, to illuminate his emphasis on interconnectivity, 
and the role of resistance in epistemic life. For there would 
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be no touch, and no sound, without resistance (friction) 
and movement. We see in these metaphors, therefore, an 
illustration not only of the centrality of resistance but of the 
need for constant and dynamic development and change 
in our epistemic life—that is, as Medina asserts in relation 
to knowledge, we are not aiming toward the arrival at some 
ﬁxed and static conclusion but, rather, at the ongoing 
generation of friction. Thus, while the standard paradigm of 
vision (which is in actuality a very deep misunderstanding 
of how vision works) invites us to think of objects as 
discrete individuals, where one actively sees and the 
other is passively seen and it is common for images to be 
understood as static, the metaphors Medina employs avoid 
this misapprehension of the social world and its role in our 
capacity as knowers. 
This being said, Medina is quite rightly concerned with the 
impact the use of such metaphors may have on those who 
lack access to one or more avenues of sense perception, 
and though his use of aural and tactile metaphors may not 
escape this concern either, he makes clear what he sees as 
the advantages of his preferred terminology. “Insensitivity 
and numbness are more appropriate than blindness 
because,” he tells us, “they can be easily extended to the 
non-perceptual, and indeed the epistemic deﬁciencies 
in question go beyond our perceptual organs” (xii). Thus, 
in addition to the disrespect the visual metaphor shows 
for blind people, Medina’s concern is that perception in 
general does not capture the full scope of the epistemic 
deﬁciencies that are the focus of the text, and so he 
proposes the terms “insensitivity” and “numbness.” 
Nevertheless, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to understand how to 
conceive of insensitivity or numbness apart from some 
appeal to sensory (and thus perceptual) organs. On the one 
hand, to be insensitive, or numb, literally just means to lack 
sensation. We may use such terms to describe emotional 
distance or lack of tact, but when we apply them in this way 
to “non-perceptual” deﬁciencies, they are still metaphors 
that appeal to the appropriate use of functioning sensory 
organs, and so do not avoid the disrespecting of those 
who lack the use of those organs. On the other hand, given 
Medina’s own commitments to the aﬀective dimension 
of epistemic interactions (81), and the foregrounding of 
embodiment (268), it seems strange for him to draw a clear 
boundary between the perceptual and the non-perceptual 
in the ﬁrst place. Insensitivity and numbness are thus, like 
metaphors of vision, metaphoric appeals to sensory organs 
(in general), yet they are more than mere metaphors, insofar 
as a polyphonic contextualism aiming at the generation of 
epistemic friction between inescapably socially embodied 
agents seems on every level to be concerned with literal, 
and not just metaphorical, sensitivity to oneself and others. 
This move does not, in other words, escape his concern 
about disrespect, and given the role that perception plays 
in his account of epistemology, it may not be possible to 
completely avoid the problem. How to address it in the 
long term is an important question beyond the scope of 
this review. 
In conclusion, Medina’s outstanding book makes a crucial 
and timely contribution to a cluster of philosophical 
problems spanning several sub-ﬁelds and disciplines that 
contribute to our understanding of the relationship between 
epistemology and oppression. It most assuredly deserves 
to be read by those theorists and activists working in and 
around these issues. 
NOTES 
1.  See Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: 
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